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The greatness of a scholarly work cannot be measured simply 
by the accolades it receives in contemporaneous reviews. The true 
test is its power to shape debate among future generations of schol-
ars; obsolescence in the academy is not the result of criticism but 
rather of neglect. That a work continues to evoke comment years 
after its publication is the highest form of scholarly commendation. 
By this measure Herbert Wechsler's lecture, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law,I published in 1959, and Alexander 
Bickel's 1962 book, The Least Dangerous Branch, surely rank as 
two of the most important works in constitutional scholarship of 
the last fifty years. In the wake of Legal Realism and amid waves of 
vitriolic criticism of the Supreme Court, Professors Wechsler and 
Bickel sought to redirect thinking about the !'ole of judicial review 
in a democracy.2 They were the most prominent and successful of 
those attempting to ground constitutional analysis on an under-
standing of democratic theory and institutional technique. 
Our purpose in revisiting their jurisprudence is to offer some 
empirical evidence about the validity of its underlying political as-
sumptions. It will be helpful, especially to those who are not famil-
iar with their writings, to begin with a brief summary of the theses. 
I 
Although they emphasized the significance of the written opin-
ion, and particularly the courts' obligation to supply plausible, prin-
cipled reasons for decisions, neither Wechsler nor Bickel believed in 
• Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Puget Sound. 
•• Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University. 
I. 73 Harv. L. Rev. I (1959). 
2. See White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and 
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973). 
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the myth of a mechanical jurisprudence. They understood that ju-
dicial decisionmaking often requires difficult choices among con-
tending values and principles. Their goal was to reconcile the 
inevitability of political choice with the demands of the judicial role. 
To apostles of judicial abnegation, they replied that judicial review 
is extremely valuable in a constitutional democracy. They believed 
that the day-to-day compromises of democratic politics should be 
balanced by an institution concerned with enduring principles. In 
response to Judge Hand's negative view of the judiciary as an aristo-
cratic anomaly barely sufferable in a democracy, they proclaimed a 
positive role for judges as articulators of the ultimate values of the 
citizenry. In their view, the necessity of giving good reasons for 
decisions served not only to limit the independent will of the judici-
ary but also uplifted political debate and reminded citizens of their 
own constitutional traditions. In response to those who viewed the 
process of legal reasoning as a fa~ade for rule by robed aristocrats, 
Wechsler and Bickel offered a vision of the judiciary educating a 
politically aware and attentive citizenry on the meaning and rele-
vance of lasting principles. 
In short, Wechsler and Bickel aimed to resolve the Realists' 
dichotomy between law and politics. Good law could be good poli-
tics. Judicial limitations, wisely employed, could be political re-
sources because those limitations legitimized judicial choices and 
distinguished them from the decisions of other political actors. 
Although they are mistakenly characterized simply as proponents 
of judicial restraint, both men eschewed a negative view of judicial 
power in favor of an appreciation of the judiciary's potential to fa-
cilitate progressive reform while maintaining a profound sensitivity 
to the tenuous nature of its claim to such a role. In a nation de-
voted to majority rule, they regarded popular consent as the foun-
dation of judicial power. 
At the outset, Professor Wechsler faced the task of distinguish-
ing judicial decisionmaking from decisionmaking in the popularly 
elected branches. Principles employed in politics, he noted, "are 
largely instrumental ... in relation to results that a controlling sen-
timent demands at any given time."J In contrast to this, 
the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely 
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment 
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved. 
To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the cases they have before 
them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, 
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles imply? Is 
3. Wechsler, supra note I, at 14. 
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it not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such other 
cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in evaluating any principle 
avowed?4 
27 
This standard, he believed, must govern both the Court's critics and 
the Court itself; throughout the lecture, Wechsler derided "result-
oriented" criticism as well as adjudication. Simply put, the 
Wechsler thesis demanded a judiciary and a citizenry appreciative 
of the significance of principle and generality in the law. 
A neutral principle, according to Wechsler, is a legal reason 
that a jurist is willing to apply beyond the circumstances of the case 
at bar and without regard to the identity of the litigants.s Because 
the opinion itself must attest to judicial competence, it should 
clearly and unequivocally articulate the neutral principle that dis-
posed of the case. Post facto rationalization via newly discovered 
neutral principles does not fulfill the judicial obligation to supply 
good reasons. By insisting that "the virtue or demerit of a judgment 
turns ... entirely on the reasons that support it,"6 Wechsler sought 
to shift judicial and public attention from the courts' results to their 
reasoning. This was a critical step in the Wechsler thesis, for his 
response to the Realist challenge was to devise (or revise) decisional 
techniques that would command consent from lay observers. 
Indeed, the central theme of Neutral Principles is that judicial 
technique is required if the courts are to secure their title to decide 
constitutional cases. 7 Hence the demands of a jurisprudence 
grounded in neutrality are rigorous. Wechsler eschewed manipula-
tion to achieve satisfying judgments. He reluctantly criticized the 
Court for what he took to be its failure in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (Brown I) to provide neutral principles for a result Wechsler 
applauded as politics but doubted he could defend as law. His will-
ingness to confront the Court over an enlightened, redemptive deci-
sion gave his piece a measure of intellectual honesty that itself 
4. !d. at 15. 
5. Wechsler did not, of course, deny that subsequent judgments of circumstances or 
litigants' characteristics might modify the principle in particular cases. Nor would he hold 
that judges may not notice extenuating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, critics who take 
Wechsler merely to revive legal formalism are misreading him. Rather Wechsler is proposing 
a mild version of Kant's categorical imperative or a practical operationalization of several of 
Lon Fuller's desiderata (specifically, that legal rules be general, publicized, and reckonable). 
See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-41, 46-51, 79-81 (1969). Wechsler is demanding 
that jurists fend off ad hoc or "private" decisionmaking by undertaking to generalize rulings 
and to systematize rules. For a perspicuous account of Wechsler's meaning, see Greenawalt, 
The Enduring Significance of .Veurral Principles, 78 COLU~l. L. REV. 982 (1978). 
6. 73 HARV. L. REV. at 19-20. 
7. See H. WECHSLER, The Sature of Judicial Reasoning. in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: 
A SYMPOSIUM 290 (S. Hooked. 1964). 
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reinforced the neutrality thesis.s 
Wechsler's distinction between adjudication and politics 
achieved the seemingly contradictory ends of providing a dynamic 
conception of judicial review while at the same time constraining 
the judicial will. Neutrality marked the limits of the legitimate use 
of judicial power; yet at the same time Wechsler augmented judicial 
power by "channeling" it within the bounds of neutrality. Once it 
satisfied the neutrality requirement, a court was free to exercise 
fearlessly the great power of judicial review. 
By demanding that courts base decisions on reasons to which 
impartial audiences might consent, Wechsler tried to reconcile judi-
cial review with majority rule. Principled decisions could withstand 
political criticism if courts and critics were compelled to reason 
publicly and neutrally. A principled court earns public confidence 
because its decisions are not based on personal whim and discretion. 
This does not mean that idiosyncrasy and ideology are absolutely 
eliminated from the judicial process; it does mean, however, that 
the citizenry may be confident that the vagaries of personal will 
have been reduced to the extent humanly possible. Technique, in 
short, legitimates judicial review. 
Wechsler insisted that neutrality was necessary at each stage of 
the adjudicatory process lest obvious exercises of discretion under-
mine the Court's authority. He extended this standard even to the 
control the Court exercised over its docket, observing that "much 
would be gained if the governing statutes could be revised to play a 
larger part in the delineation of the causes that make rightful call 
upon the time and energy of the Supreme Court."9 Indeed, he sug-
gested that the absence of discretionary jurisdiction during the 
Marshall era protected that Court from charges of arbitrariness. 10 
In the Wechslerian scheme, the only powers safely exercised by the 
courts are those defensible in public by judicial reasons based on 
neutral principles. 
8. Unfortunately it also encouraged a misunderstanding of his central point. Wechsler 
found deviations from the "separate but equal" rule unobjectionable if neutral principles sup-
ported a reexamination of the original reasoning of the Court. Thus Miller and Scheflin err in 
claiming that Wechsler represented a resurrection of mechanical jurisprudence or a call for 
strict adherence to precedent. Miller & Scheftin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age 
of the Positive State, 1967 DUKE L.J. 273. Within the Wechsler thesis, doctrinal change is 
always possible as long as neutral and general reasons are provided to support the new rule. 
Furthermore, Professor Wechsler was not writing the brief for extreme judicial deference to 
either the other branches of government or public opinion. As Greenawalt has noted. supra 
note 5, at 993, Wechsler was quite prepared to defend the duty and power of the Court to 
proceed without popular consent and in the face of resistance ({the Court could construct a 
judicial justification for so doing. 
9. Wechsler, supra note I, at 10. 
10. /d. 
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If Wechsler anathematized judicial discretion, Bickel very 
nearly canonized it. Bickel shared with Wechsler the belief that the 
judiciary is the institution best equipped to articulate and apply the 
fundamental principles of American government. Furthermore, he 
agreed that judicial review must be a principled exercise. Where the 
two differed was over what Bickel termed "expediency." Wechsler 
allowed no leeway for the courts to avoid the demands of principle; 
to do so would seriously compromise the legitimacy of judicial re-
view. Professor Bickel, however, feared that unrelenting devotion 
to principle would place the judiciary on a collision course with 
political reality. He encouraged the Justices to use pragmatic and 
prudent discretion in deciding whether to hear a case or reach a 
constitutional issue. Such decisions, he urged, should be grounded 
on expediency: 
The essentially important fact, so often missed, is that the Court wields a threefold 
power. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent with principle. It may vali-
date ... legislation as consistent with principle. Or it may do neither. It may do 
neither, and therein lies the secret of its ability to maintain itself in the tension 
between principle and expediency.' I 
When cases were not appropriate for principled disposition, or 
when principles would lead to decisions that would be ignored or 
attacked, Bickel urged the expedient use of what he termed the 
"techniques of avoidance." 
Bickel thus neatly merged the Realists' belief that politics moti-
vates judicial decisions with the traditionalists' norm that politics 
should never affect the process of adjudication. He embraced both 
sides of the debate by insisting that the Justices blend politics with 
law and balance principle with expediency. As the means of accom-
plishing this feat of judicial statesmanship, Bickel proposed "the 
passive virtues." These were tools by which the Court could exer-
cise the third, neglected option-the option of doing nothing. Ex-
pedient use of the standing requirement, mootness, abstention, or 
even simply denial of certiorari enabled the Court to pursue a 
"mediating way" between legitimation and invalidation. The pas-
sive virtues provided a tactical escape from the Hobson's choice of 
invalidating legislation on principles considered unacceptable by the 
populace or abandoning principle to the transient will of the people. 
Armed with the passive virtues, a principled Court could also be a 
political Court. 
Moreover, creative use of the techniques of avoidance might 
strengthen the democratic process. By dismissing cases with appro-
priate hints to the majoritarian institutions, the Justices could stir 
II. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 69 (1962) (emphasis in original). 
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debate within the community, leading the politicians to rectify the 
problem. In this way, the Court could minimize meddling in the 
democratic process while husbanding its authority for cases where 
intervention in defense of principle was unavoidable. Even when 
the representative branches failed to respond or acted irresponsibly, 
the debate might generate conclusions that the Court could then 
legitimate. At the very least, this "continuing colloquy with the 
political institutions and with society at large"I2 would be far more 
compatible with the demands of democracy than a counter-
majoritarian Court unleashing thunderbolts of principle from on 
high. 
II 
The contentions of Wechsler and Bickel have been evaluated 
thoroughly from jurisprudential perspectives.I3 Little has been 
said, however, about the validity of their empirical assumptions 
concerning the effect of "bad" decisions on public attitudes toward 
the Court. Is it true, as they suggested, that "neutral principles" 
and "passive virtues" make controversial decisions more acceptable 
to the public? 
There are grounds for suspecting that neutral principles have 
little or nothing to do with public reactions to the Court's decisions. 
For example, congressional attempts to punish the Court for unwel-
come decisions are often unrelated to whether the decisions were 
principled and cogently justified in the opinions.I4 Social scientists 
have demonstrated the obvious fact that most citizens lack the mini-
mal prerequisities for thoughtful assessment of judicial opinions. Is 
Even among sophisticated observers, result-oriented appraisals are 
far more common than Wechsler acknowledged.I6 
If we turn from Wechsler to Bickel, we again find grounds for 
12. /d. at 240. 
13. E.g., Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Greenawalt, supra note 5; 
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues, •:_A Comment on Principle and Expedi-
ency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I (1964); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutral-
ity in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960); Miller & Scheftin, supra 
note 8; White, supra note 2. 
14. C. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT AND ITS CRITICS 29-49 (1968); W. MURPHY, 
CONGRESS AND THE COURT 127-241 (1962). 
15. Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, in 
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (1969); W. MURPHY, J. TANENHAUS & D. KASTNER, 
PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
(1973). 
16. See Dolbeare & Hammond, The Political Party Basis of Attitudes Toward the 
Supreme Court, 32 PuB. OPINION Q. 16 (1968); Nagel & Erikson, Editorial Reaction to 
Supreme Court Decisions on Church and State, 30 PuB. OPINION Q. 647 (1966-1967). 
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doubting key, empirical assumptions. For the passive virtues to 
perform the mediating function that Bickel assigns to them, two of 
his assumptions must be valid: (1) that lay publics can differentiate 
decisions on the merits from decisions not to hear or not to decide 
on the merits of a constitutional claim; and (2) that the public will 
accept, with no political cost to the Court, the avoidance of substan-
tive, principled conclusions to cases. 
Professor Gerald Gunther has stated the case against the first 
assumption: 
It is true, of course, that rulings of "nonunconstitutionality" are often viewed 
as approvals of the legislative policy. But that, as Bickel recognizes, is the result of 
popular misinterpretation of the Court's actions .... 
. . . If, despite the Court's reminders that failure to invalidate a law is not 
approval of its wisdom, mistaken impressions persist, can we really expect to be 
substantially better off if the Court "stays its hand, and makes clear that it is staying 
its hand and not legitimating?" A Court "staying its hand" is, after all, failing to 
invalidate; and a public so inattentive to the Court's reasons as to confuse wisdom 
with constitutionality is not likely to perceive that "staying its hand" falls short of 
"legitimation. "17 
Is Bickel's assumption as unreasonable as Gunther asserts? Can the 
attentive public distinguish between decisions on the merits and 
those that avoid the merits? 
And what about Bickel's other assumption? When the Justices 
duck an alleged "duty to decide," do many observers object? Bickel 
did anticipate that a number of observers might prefer to lose a sub-
stantive decision than to endure the uncertainties of a "judicial mis-
fire."Is Was he wrong? Does the Court reap more opposition by 
avoiding a decision than by reaching the merits with an unprinci-
pled decision? 
To examine the empirical basis for assumptions underlying the 
theories of Professors Bickel and Wechsler, we studied the reactions 
of editorialists for major American daily newspapers to several 
landmark decisions of the Supreme Court.I9 First, we tested 
Wechsler's assumption by examining editorial reactions to the three 
decisions explicitly criticized in Neutral Principles: Brown I ;2o 
Shelley v. Kraemer2I (invalidating racially-restrictive land cove-
17. Gunther. supra note 13, at 7 (footnote omitted). 
18. A. BICKEL. supra note II, at 112-13. 
19. For all cases from 1944 to 1955, editorials were sought from forty-three major 
newspapers available on microfilm in Washington. D.C. This sample included five papers 
with predominantly black readership and twenty-two dailies from cities that mandated segre-
gated schools as of May 1954. For responses after I 969, we supplemented this original sam-
ple with data from Editorials on File. a service that collects editorials on major topics of the 
day. 
20. 34 7 U.S. 483 (I 954 ). 
21. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
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nants); and Smith v. Allwrighf22 (invalidating the white primary). 
We found little evidence that neutrality and generality are necessary 
for widespread acceptance by the editorialists of a constitutional de-
CISion. Then we considered editorials written in response to 
DeFunis v. Odegaard,z3 a famous recent example of judicial avoid-
ance. Reaction to this case illustrates the serious costs incurred 
through the use of the passive virtues in cases where the public ex-
pects a decision on the merits. While these reactions do not wholly 
invalidate the Bickel thesis, they do suggest that the efficacy of the 
techniques of avoidance may be limited to less visible and less sali-
ent cases. 
Editorialists provide an excellent audience for testing the poli-
tical assumptions of Bickel and Wechsler. Because both men ar-
ticulated ways to manage the "amorphous power of public 
reaction"24 we must evaluate the political advisability of their tech-
niques with reference to an audience. It would be foolish, however, 
to focus on mass audiences, because ample research attests to the 
inattention of the average citizen. Editorialists, in contrast, are 
sophisticated enough to appreciate or deprecate the reasoning of the 
Court while at the same time considering the political, social, and 
cultural concerns of their readers. Disciplined by the demands of 
their employers and their readers, editorialists' opinions are likely 
to reflect the standards and capabilities of their most informed read-
ers. Certainly the editorialists are likely to be more sophisticated 
than most citizens, and thus we may interpret their responses as the 
most we can expect from the citizenry at large; indeed, many citi-
zens probably gain their opinions of the work of the Supreme Court 
from the writings of editorialists. Finally, editorials-unlike there-
sponses of most other publics-are available without obtrusive sur-
veying, and in a format fairly comparable from respondent to 
respondent. 
22. 321 u.s. 649 (1944). 
23. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In DeFunis, the petitioner, a white male, contended that he 
had been unconstitutionally denied admission to the University of Washington Law School as 
a result of the law school's affirmative action admissions program. A five-man majority of the 
Court held the case moot because the petitioner, who had been attending the law school 
during the pendency of the action as the result of a lower court order, would graduate from 
the law school regardless of the outcome of the case. Justice Douglas was the only dissenter 
who stated his view of the merits of the claim. 
24. D. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 3 (1968). Wechsler was 
less explicit about this, but his goal of discovering standards of legal argument that would 
guide and bind judges and their critics would only make "democratic" sense if those stan-
dards satisfied those who were not experts. Bickel clearly anticipated the efficacy of the pas-
sive virtues beyond lawyers and judges. Indeed, Gunther observed that if Bickel did not 
intend the passive virtues to "work" on attentive lay observers, their function was unclear. 
Gunther, supra note 13, at 7. 
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If, indeed, neutral principles are a minimal prereqmstte for 
legitimation of judicial decisions, we should expect editorialists to 
bridle at decisions identified by Wechsler as deficient in neutrality 
or generality. If editorialists failed to discern the absence of 
principle or at least failed to object to the flaws cited by Wechsler, 
then it is hard to maintain that neutral principles are actually neces-
sary for public acceptance of decisions. Table 1 reveals that the 
flaws in three landmark decisions that Wechsler singled out for crit-
icism did not lead to greater disapproval among editorialists than 
the opinions in two contemporaneous landmarks that Wechsler did 
not criticize.25 In each of the five cases, a majority of the editorial-
ists supported the decision of the Court. Although responses to 
both Allwright and Brown I were somewhat less approving than the 
responses to Sweatt v. Painter (which Wechsler did not single out 
for criticism), the responses to Shelley (which Wechsler specifically 
found wanting in neutrality) were roughly the same as those to 
Sweatt. Surprisingly, the greatest percentage of approving editorials 
greeted Brown I, a decision seldom cited as a paragon of neutrality. 
Focusing on explicit approval alone actually understates the 
difficulties with Wechsler's assumption. If neutral principles are po-
litically essential rather than marginally helpful or occasionally ad-
visable, then this sophisticated audience presumably would 
explicitly disapprove of decisions that lack neutrality. If we take 
the absence of explicit disapproval to betoken acquiescence, the row 
percentages in Table 1 are damning evidence. Acquiescence (i.e, 
approval and neutrality combined) overwhelms disapproval and 
ambivalence combined by more than three to one in Allwright and 
by more than four to one in Brown 1 In response to Shelley, twenty 
out of twenty-one editorials available were either approving or 
neutral. 
Many of the editorialists may have so welcomed the results of 
these cases that they were loath to be too critical of the Court's 
reasoning. Needless to say, such acceptance does not bode well for 
the Wechsler thesis because it suggests that substantive agreement 
with the Court suffices to ensure popular approval of a decision. 
25. In addition to the cases cited in notes 17-19, we examined editorials discussing 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 
U.S. 294 (1955). Both of these are racial discrimination cases that Wechsler did not expressly 
criticize in his article. 
Three coders judged the evaluation of the landmarks by each editorial. Editorials were 
coded "approving" if they expressly lauded the decision of the Court and did not expressly 
criticize the decision. Editorials that criticized without any express praise were coded "disap-
proving." If the editorial expressed both criticism and praise its was coded "ambivalent." If 
no explicit evaluation was forthcoming, it was coded as "neutral." The judgment of two of 
the three coders was sufficient to overrule the third coder. 
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TABLE 1 
Editorial Reactions to Selected Racial Justice Cases, by Region 
EDITORIAL REQIQ~S 
DECISION REACTION "NORTH" "SOUTH" TOTAL 
N % N % N % 
Smith v. Allwright Disapproval 0 0 5 31 5 18 
Neutrality 3 25 4 25 7 25 
Ambivalence 0 0 I 6 I 4 
Approval 9 75 6 38 15 54 
12 100 16 100 28 101 
Shelley v. Kraemer Disapproval 0 0 I 8 1 5 
Neutrality 2 25 5 39 7 33 
Ambivalence 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Approval 6 75 7 54 13 62 
- -8 100 13 101 21 100 
Sweatt v. Painter Disapproval 0 0 2 12 2 7 
Neutrality 2 14 6 35 8 26 
Ambivalence 0 0 2 12 2 7 
Approval 12 86 7 41 19 61 
14 100 17 100 31 101 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. I Disapproval I 5 4 20 5 12 
Neutrality 2 10 9 45 11 27 
Ambivalence 0 0 I 5 1 2 
Approval 18 86 6 30 24 59 
21 101 20 100 41 100 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II Disapproval 3 17 1 5 4 II 
Neutrality 2 II 7 35 9 24 
Ambivalence I 6 0 0 1 3 
Approval 12 67 12 60 24 63 
18 101 20 100 38 101 
KEY: 
"North" = Newspaper published in state that did not mandate segregation. 
"South" = Newspaper published in state that mandated segregation in schools in May, 
1954. 
Neutrality = Editorial took no explicit stance on decision. 
Ambivalence = Editorial explicitly approved and disapproved of decision. 
Moreover, if we find that those editorialists with reason to condemn 
the results of the three decisions were nevertheless disposed to ac-
cept them, then neutral principles will not have been necessary to 
induce acceptance even among expected critics. Table 1 shows that 
among editorialists for newspapers in states that mandated segre-
gated schools there was far less opposition to the decisions than we 
might expect. If, as above, we count as acquiescent all editorialists 
who did not express disapproval of any aspect of the decision, every 
decision expressly criticized by Wechsler elicited acquiescence from 
at least sixty percent of the southern and border-state editorialists. 
Given Wechsler's conclusion that these opinions lacked both neu-
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trality and generality, the fact that we get so little criticism of any 
kind from this particular audience raises serious doubts about the 
Wechsler thesis. 
A brief review of the reasons that editorialists gave for their 
reactions undermines Wechsler's contentions still further. In 
response to Allwright, supporting editorials tended to emphasize the 
justice of the holding while underemphasizing the opinion's reason-
ing.26 One would expect opponents of integrated primaries to point 
to any presumed weaknesses in the Court's reasoning. Instead, 
criticisms were almost entirely result-oriented.27 Editorial re-
sponses to Shelley v. Kraemer displayed a similar willingness to ac-
cept the Court's reasoning. Approving editorialists applauded the 
common-sense realism of the Court; once again the moral rectitude 
of the decision was central and the reasoning of the opinion periph-
eral.2s The only opponent of Shelley objected to the result and not 
the reasoning.29 
Wechsler made Brown I the prime example of lack of neutral-
ity in judicial decisionmaking and one would expect the reaction to 
Brown I to illustrate the wisdom of the Wechsler thesis. Only five 
newspapers, however, explicitly opposed the decision; four of the 
five attacked neither the reasoning nor the neutrality of the Court.Jo 
Only the New Orleans Times Picayune argued with the logic of 
Brown l3I Professor Wechsler's criticism notwithstanding, the 
26. See. e.g., The Supreme Court Puts "Real Democracy" Up to the American People, 
Cleveland Call and Post, April 15, 1944, at 8; Truth, Logic and Justice Win in Court, Louis-
ville Courier J., April 5, 1944, at 6; A Victory for Democracy, St. Louis Post Dispatch, April 
4. 1944, at 28; Political Equality Upheld, Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 4, 1944, at 6. 
27. The Memphis Commercial Appeal found an absence of neutrality but not of the type 
that concerned Wechsler: "The Court's decision is right down the alley of the New Deal and 
in thorough consonance with the Communist-inspired policy of ruling through balancing 
minorities." April 5, 1944, at 6. The Dallas Morning News disagreed with the Court's con-
clusion that political parties were agents of the state while admitting that the policies of the 
state of Texas might have abetted that finding. April 5, 1944, § II, at 2. Only the Charleston 
(S.C.) News and Courier even approximated Wechsler's concern. April 4, 1944, at I. 
28. See, e.g., A New Emancipation Proclamation, Pittsburgh Courier, May 22, 1948, at 
4; Equal Protection, Wash. Post, May 6, 1948, at A8; Restrictive Deed Given Highest Court 
Kayo, Dallas Morning News, May 5, 1948, §IV, at 2; Voluntary Housing "Segregation" 
Okayed, Atlanta Constitution, May 5, 1948, at 8; No Standing in Court, Wash. Star, May 4, 
1948, at A8; An Equal Rights Victory, St. Louis Globe Democrat, May 4, 1948, at 2C. 
29. Charlotte Observer, May 6, 1948, at 12A. 
30. The Los Angeles Times described the practical problems entailed by the ruling but 
allowed that the Court hardly could have reasoned otherwise on the legal issues. May 19, 
1954, § II, at 4. The Atlanta Constitution was utterly result-oriented in deploring the decision 
for the practical difficulties it raised. May 18, 1954, at 4. Both the Birmingham News, May 
18, 1954, at 10, and the Charleston (S.C.) News and Courier, May 18, 1954, at I, preferred 
separate but equal, but neither questioned the reasoning of the Court. 
31. May 18, 1954, at 8. 
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opinion in Brown I drew relatively little negative comment; it is 
hard to see how "neutral principles" could have worked any better. 
Evidence from the editorial reaction to these "flawed" opinions 
does not, of course, rebut every aspect of Wechsler's advice to 
judges.32 It does, however, suggest that the legitimacy of the Court 
is hardly as precarious as Wechsler assumed. Certainly the evi-
dence justifies a healthy skepticism about the proposition that neu-
tral principles are necessary to ensure public acceptance of judicial 
decisions. Before an audience of judges and lawyers, these decisions 
might be condemned for their lack of neutral principles. By a so-
phisticated lay audience, however, the Court's efforts seem to be 
appraised with essentially political criteria. 
Bickel assumed that lay observers could distinguish judicial 
avoidance from judicial disposition on the merits. He also assumed 
that the avoidance of some decisions would generate more public 
acceptance-or at least less public criticism-than disposition on 
principled grounds. We test these assumptions below with refer-
ence to DeFunis v. Odegaard, a landmark of judicial avoidance. We 
would prefer to test a variety of decisions employing the passive 
virtues, but such cases rarely evoke editorial comment. Because 
Bickel's argument would make little sense if he were counseling 
avoidance of Il"inimally visible cases, we restrict ourselves to consid-
eration of the impact of the techniques of avoidance in a highly 
visible, much-awaited decision. 
Gunther criticized Bickel for assuming that the public can dis-
tinguish decisions avoided from decisions on the merits. For the 
mass public such skepticism may well be warranted. Bickel's posi-
tion may be saved, however, by limiting his assumption to the abili-
ties of relatively attentive and sophisticated laypersons such as 
editorialists. Only one of the responses to the DeFunis decision that 
we collected mistook it for a ruling on the merits.33 The evidence, 
while hardly compelling, does suggest that the editorialists can 
make the distinction so necessary for the Bickel thesis. 34 
On the other hand, as Table 2 indicates, a plurality of editorial-
ists explicitly disapproved of DeFunis. Contrary to what a reader of 
32. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, for a discussion of the many virtues of the Wechsler 
thesis. 
33. Atlanta Daily World, April 26, 1974, at 4. 
34. Moreover, Editorials on File, 1970-1984, contains ten sets of editorials on cases in 
which the Supreme Court avoided determination on the merits (mainly denials of certiorari). 
In eight of the ten instances, editorials correctly perceiving the action of the Court outnum· 
bered those that did not by more than two to one. While there does seem to be some relation· 
ship between the visibility of the litigation and the perception of avoidance, we conclude that 
editorialists, for the most part, are capable of making the necessary distinctions. 
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Bickel might suppose, opposition to DeFunis, in fact, exceeded op-
position to the Bakke decision in which the Court first grappled 
with the issue of constitutionality of affirmative action in admissions 
to professional schools.3s Opposition to DeFunis exceeded that to 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,36 in which the Court up-
held an affirmative action plan negotiated by a private employer and 
a union against a challenge based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. From the figures set forth in Table 2, it is difficult to 
see what the Court gained politically by mooting DeFunis, particu-
larly in light of the fact that it hardly could be said that in the years 
between DeFunis and Bakke the community reached a consensus on 
the resolution of the affirmative action question. Only three news-
papers in the sample explicitly endorsed the outcome in DeFunis; 
ten times that many endorsed the results in Bakke and Weber. 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 37 and Milliken 
v. Bradley 3s are also included in Table 2 to provide further basis for 
comparison. 
TABLE 2 
Editorial Reactions to Recent Racial Justice Decisions 
Explicit Inexplicit Explicit 
Decision NE Approval Position Disapproval 
1971 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 65 32.5% 50.8% 16.9% 
1974 DeFunis v. Odegaard 33 6.1 42.4 51.5 
1974 Milliken v. Bradley 36 52.8 16.7 30.6 
1978 Regents v. Bakke 69 42.0 47.8 10.1 
1979 Steelworkers v. Weber 45 66.7 4.4 28.9 
KEY: 
NE = Number of editorials that responded to ruling. 
Disagreements with the Court's action in DeFunis were often 
salty, as headlines from several critical editorials make clear:39 
"DUCKING A DIFFICULT CASE" 
"DODGING AN IMPORTANT ISSUE" 
"SIDESTEPPING THE QUOTA ISSUE" 
35. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
36. 443 u.s. 193 (1979). 
37. 402 U.S. I (1971). 
38. 433 u.s. 267 (1977). 
39. Headlines respectively from Charleston (S.C.) News and Courier, April 27, 1974, at 
lOA; Memphis Commercial Appeal, April26, 1974, at 4; Dallas News, April26, 1974, at 2D; 
Milwaukee Sentinel, April26, 1974, at 18; Rocky Mountain News, April25, 1974, at 66; San 
Francisco Chron., April25, 1974, at 38; Detroit News, April25, 1974, at lOB; St. Petersburg 
Times, April 24, 1974, at 22A. 
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"THE SUPREME COURT DUCKS" 
"MISSED OPPORTUNITY" 
"HIGH COURT DUCKS" 
"THE COURT DODGES A CASE OF BIAS" 
"A NEEDLESS DELAY" 
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These headlines reveal the dismay of many editorialists that a 
much-anticipated articulation of constitutional standards was not 
forthcoming. Needless to say, this reaction undermines Bickel's as-
sumption that the passive virtues bolster the Court's legitimacy. 
Although evasion in DeFunis was costly, the cost of avoidance 
may have been less than the cost of decision. To shed some light on 
this intriguing problem, we cross-tabulated responses to DeFunis 
with reponses to Bakke and Weber. In response to both of the deci-
sions on the merits, at least half of the critics of DeFunis expressed 
approval of the rulings. Seven of the nine editorialists who took no 
position on DeFunis explicitly endorsed Weber. Of the 12 newspa-
pers coded as inexplicit on the DeFunis case, four explicitly ap-
proved the disposition in Bakke and none disagreed explicitly. 
Thus DeFunis elicited disapproval from newspapers that, as best we 
can surmise, would have approved of-or at least acquiesced in-a 
decision on the merits. 
What is perhaps most striking about the editorialists' reactions 
to DeFunis is that it was not the specific use of the mootness doc-
trine that provoked criticism but rather the avoidance of the deci-
sion per se. That is, most criticism of DeFunis was not based on a 
perception that this was a particularly inept use of the passive vir-
tues. Table 4 allows us to compare the two major reasons the 
editorialists gave for their reactions to DeFunis.#J Acquiescence 
and opposition to the decision are cross-tabulated with evaluations 
of ( 1) the specific use of the mootness doctrine in DeFunis, and 
(2) the duty of the Court to decide important constitutional issues. 
Less than half of the disapproving editorialists name the misuse of 
mootness as cause for disapproval while all of these editorialists 
cited the unacceptability of avoidance. Of the editorialists who ac-
qiesced in the decision, five were moved to lament the absence of a 
decision on the merits. 
40. Table 3 dichotomizes the variables for interpretive convenience. Hence editorialists 
are divided into explicit opposition (to the holding, to the use of mootness, or to avoidance) 
and "non-opposition" (explicit approval or inexplicitness). We tabulate in this way because 
the success of Bickel's passive virtues, in our judgment, requires only that the Court secure 
acquiescence. The Court does not need the outright, expressed approval of its publics for the 
hypothesized legitimation to occur. Silence is sufficient and thus in Table 3 we treat silence as 
assent. 
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TABLE 3 
Editorial Evaluations of DeFunis v. Odegaard Cross-Tabulated 
with Evaluations of Regents v. Bakke and Steelworkers v. Weber 
Explicit Inexplicit Explicit Total 
Disapproval Position Approval 
BAKKE 
Explicit Disapproval 0 0 
Inexplicit Position 4 8 0 12 
Explicit Approval 5 4 2 II 
-
Total 10 12 2 24 
WEBER 
Explicit Disapproval 2 4 
Inexplicit Position 0 0 
Explicit Approval 4 7 I 12 
Total 6 9 2 17 
TABLE 4 
Explicit Grounds for Opposition and Acquiescence in DeFunis 
EDITORIAL STANCE ON DEFUNIS 
Acquiescence 
This Use of Mootness Incorrect 













Opposition = Explicit disagreement with Court's ruling. 
Acquiescence = Explicit agreement with Court's ruling or inexplicit position. 
This Use of Mootness Incorrect = Explicit statement that DeFunis was not technically 
moot. 
This Use of Mootness Correct = No explicit statement concerning the technical 
mootness of DeFunis or explicit statement that DeFunis was moot. 
"Nondecision" Unacceptable = Explicit opposition to postponement of decision on 
affirmative action issue. 
"Nondecision" Acceptable = No explicit opposition to postponement of decision on 
affirmative action issue, or explicit approval of postponement. 
The data point to the conclusion that avoidance is a political 
problem for the Court. Indeed, it is a problem of sufficient magni-
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tude that one wonders whether the cost of avoidance in highly 
visible cases exceeds the cost of an unpopular decision on the mer-
its. At the very least these data may suggest that an important, 
sophisticated, segment of the lay public lacks the patience so neces-
sary to Bickel's theory of judicial review. 
III 
The controversy over the legitimacy of judicial review in a con-
stitutional democracy has been characterized as the "central prob-
lem of contemporary constitutional theory."4t There is, perhaps, 
no more fitting tribute to the enduring influence of Bickel and 
Wechsler than the accuracy of this statement. Without question, 
they were among the most eloquent and persuasive of those who 
considered the examination of the "counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty"42 to be the essential task of constitutional scholars. More-
over, and perhaps most importantly, they recognized the question 
of legitimacy to be one of practical politics as well as democratic 
theory. Regardless of the intent of the framers or the demands of 
the separation of powers, Bickel and Wechsler understood that in 
the final analysis judicial review is dependent on the will of the 
citizenry. 
The effort to reconcile the tension between judicial review and 
majority rule in terms of both practical politics and democratic the-
ory led Wechsler and Bickel to an emphasis on judicial technique 
and the role of principle. If judicial decisions could be shown to be 
based on desirable qualities normally absent from democratic poli-
tics, then judicial review was defensible despite its undemocratic 
character. Furthermore, adherence to certain techniques, be they of 
avoidance or neutrality, would facilitate public acceptance of judi-
cial actions. In short, principle and technique, properly employed, 
would result in a powerful and politically acceptable Supreme 
Court. 
In joining practical politics with democratic theory, Bickel and 
Wechsler defined the boundaries of normative constitutional schol-
arship for a generation of scholars. The data presented here are not 
intended to disparage their work but rather to suggest the difficul-
ties inherent in such an approach. Although legitimacy is a pri-
41. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1982); see 
also Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Con-
stitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and A Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93 
(1983). 
42. The phrase is Bickel's. See A. BICKEL, supra note II, at 16. 
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mary topic in current normative constitutional scholarship, we 
know strikingly little about how publics comprehend, or even learn 
of judicial decisions.43 Focusing on the reactions of selected editori-
alists is an admittedly imperfect method of approaching the prob-
lem. Nevertheless, the data suggest that the techniques proposed by 
Bickel and Wechsler are, at best, ineffectual and, at worst, actually 
lessen public support of judicial action. Phrased in more general 
terms, they suggest that the two dimensions of the legitimacy ques-
tion-public acceptance and democratic theory-often work in op-
posite directions. This possibility did not appear to affect Bickel 
and Wechsler and it certainly has not deterred those who followed 
their lead. The result is that modern, normative constitutional 
scholarship often consists of finely tuned, eloquently argued theories 
of judicial review in which respected scholars simply assert that 
their theory will result in enhanced legitimacy for the Court. Un-
fortunately, minimal attention has been directed to the question of 
whether these assertions are grounded in anything firmer than the 
faith of their authors. 
Recently Professor Paul Mishkin has written in praise of the 
Court's disposition of the Bakke case. 44 He did not attempt to de-
fend Bakke in terms of principle; indeed, he acknowledged that the 
outcome could not be justified by any notion of principle. Rather 
he found the ambivalent posture of the Court "to be a wise and 
politic resolution of an exceedingly difficult social problem."4s In 
effect, the Court's "unprincipled" stance in Bakke recognized 
deeply held beliefs on both sides of the issue and, as a result, dif-
fused the intensity of the debate surrounding the issue of race-
conscious affirmative action. One survey of editorialists suggests 
that Mishkin is correct in his assessment of Bakke. 46 Bakke worked 
because it appeared to provide a reasonable solution to a seemingly 
intractable problem. Wechsler and Bickel, and their successors in 
the tradition of normative constitutional scholarship, have failed to 
provide coherent theories that account for the public success of de-
cisions like Bakke. Until we do, the crucial link between public 
consent and judicial power will remain obscured. As long as we 
proceed to think and write about judicial legitimacy without 
43. See, e.g. l. BERKSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS PUBLICS (1978); C. JoHN-
SON & B. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984). 
44. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Con-
stitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 907 (1983). 
45. Id. at 929. 
46. See W. HALTOM, VIRTUES PASSIVE AND ACTIVE: SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
AND THE ATTENTIVE PUBLIC (1985) (unpublished paper, American Political Science 
Association). 
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grounding theories in the attitudes and evaluations of the actual 
audiences of the judges, legitimacy will remain "a symbol without 
content that plugs a hole in an argument."47 
47. L. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME 
CoURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS 56 (1985). 
